Reconciling Morality and Moral Responsibility in the Law: A Due Process Challenge to the Inconsistent Mental Responsibility Standards at Play in Criminal Insanity Defenses and Sexually Violent Predator Civil Commitment Hearings by Price, Jeremy T.
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 32
Number 4 Summer 2005 Article 3
1-1-2005
Reconciling Morality and Moral Responsibility in
the Law: A Due Process Challenge to the
Inconsistent Mental Responsibility Standards at
Play in Criminal Insanity Defenses and Sexually
Violent Predator Civil Commitment Hearings
Jeremy T. Price
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jeremy T. Price, Reconciling Morality and Moral Responsibility in the Law: A Due Process Challenge to the Inconsistent Mental Responsibility
Standards at Play in Criminal Insanity Defenses and Sexually Violent Predator Civil Commitment Hearings, 32 Hastings Const. L.Q. 987
(2005).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol32/iss4/3
Reconciling Morality and Moral
Responsibility in the Law: A Due Process
Challenge to the Inconsistent Mental
Responsibility Standards at Play in Criminal
Insanity Defenses and Sexually Violent
Predator Civil Commitment Hearings
by JEREMY T. PRICE*
I. Introduction
When an individual's liberty is at stake, procedural schemes that
allow the state to simultaneously endorse diametrically opposed
mental responsibility standards undermine the moral backbone of our
legal system. Legislative enactments that take such a disingenuous
approach to rulemaking demonstrate a dangerous absence of an
identifiable guiding morality and cannot be saved by the mere
recitation of a legitimate governmental interest. And yet, that is
precisely the have-your-cake-and-eat-it-too approach adopted by
many states in this country when instituting policies for the civil
commitment of sexually violent offenders!
When seeking to civilly commit an inmate nearing release from
prison, states often adopt a formulation of mental responsibility for
criminal behavior that is inconsistent with the standard on which they
rely when rebutting a criminal insanity defense. This contradiction
. J.D. 2005, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A. 1997, Brown
University. The author lives in San Francisco and recently joined the First District
Appellate Project as a staff attorney. His professional interests include indigent criminal
defense and mental health law. He would like to thank Professor David Faigman for his
advice during the writing of this note.
1. Civil commitment involves the involuntary transfer of custody of a person to the
state for "control, care and treatment until such time as the person's mental abnormality
or personality disorder has so changed that the person is safe to be at large." KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 59-29a07(a) (1994).
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draws into question the legitimacy of the state's position in both
contexts and fails to adequately address the fundamental issue of
what constitutes mental and moral responsibility.
Procedural fairness can only be attained through a consistent
framework based on an identifiable guiding morality. The morality of
a procedural scheme must be judged, however, independent of the
subjective inquiry into contemporary morality made by lawmakers
considering social legislation. Attitudes toward the relationship
between mental health and criminal responsibility have fluctuated
over time. Societal morals as a whole perpetually evolve, and the law
- for better or worse - adapts concurrently. But as a society's moral
perspectives change, the procedural mechanisms by which resulting
moral legislation is exercised must continue to respect the law's
guiding principles of fairness and consistency. Otherwise, systems put
in place during a period dominated by one moral viewpoint fail to
operate in concert with those implemented during an era marked by a
different notion of morality, thereby subjecting individuals to unfair,
inconsistent fates.
Many jurisdictions in the United States now apply inconsistent
mental and moral responsibility standards in criminal and civil
proceedings. Defendants are permitted to raise certain incapacity
defenses in one context, and yet they are prohibited from advancing
those same defenses in another. As a result, the state is now able to
seek criminal punishment on the theory that a defendant is legally
sane and then later argue that the same person has a serious mental
abnormality characterized by a propensity to engage in criminal
conduct and should be involuntarily detained.
Judgments on the morality of an individual's conduct should be
governed by a procedure that reveals the morality of the
prosecutorial system itself and in turn engenders confidence and
respect for that system. Instead, the moral underpinnings of the
procedures that govern society's determination of moral
responsibility have become unhinged.
Procedural morality is often safeguarded by the notion of due
process as well as the legal doctrines of double jeopardy and
collateral estoppel, which both serve to prevent the relitigation of
final judgments. This article highlights the inconsistency found in
criminal insanity defense and civil commitment mental responsibility
standards and articulates a new due process paradigm, incorporating
double jeopardy and collateral estoppel, that compels a reconciliation
of these standards in order to maintain fairness and to preserve an
identifiable guiding morality behind legislative enactments.
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II. Background on Sexually Violent Predator Civil
Commitment Statutes
In Kansas v. Hendricks,2 the United States Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the Kansas statute3 that allows the
state to civilly commit individuals convicted of certain enumerated
sex crimes just prior to the completion of their criminal sentences,
thereby extending their confinement beyond the duration of their
criminal term. The Court found the Kansas scheme provided
sufficient procedural safeguards by requiring a separate hearing to
determine whether these individuals present a risk of danger to
themselves or others as a result of a volitional mental abnormality.
4
According to the Court, state statutes that follow the Kansas model
do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause,5 the Due Process
Clauses,6 or the Ex Post Facto Clause7 of the United States
Constitution.8 The Court relied primarily on the Kansas legislature's
professed regulatory intent and public safety rationale in enacting the
Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act ("the Kansas SVP Act") in
determining that its provisions are civil (and not criminal) and
therefore avoid running afoul of the Constitution.9
Arguments that statutes like the Kansas SVP Act violate the
aforementioned constitutional clauses are straightforward, if
unsuccessful to date.' ° These laws implicate the Double Jeopardy
Clause because the underlying act at the heart of the prior criminal trial
serves as the primary trigger for the initiation of the subsequent civil
commitment hearing. Thus, defendants have argued that they face
separate, consecutive periods of judicially enforced confinement for the
same proscribed conduct.' The Due Process Clauses are drawn into
the debate by the predictive and unreliable nature of the standard of
2. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
3. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a0 (1994).
4. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("(N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .
6. Id. ("No person shall be... deprived of... liberty.., without due process of
law .... ); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall... deprive any person of...
liberty ... without due process of law .... ).
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No ... ex post facto Law shall be passed."); U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall... pass any ... ex post facto Law.
8. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371.
9. Id. at 368-69.
10. See id. at 371.
11. See id. at 369.
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proof that is permitted to support a deprivation of liberty pursuant to a
civil commitment hearing. 2 Lastly, the Ex Post Facto Clause comes
into play as a result of the additional involuntary detention imposed
after the issuance of the offender's criminal sentence, particularly when
the state seeks to commit individuals convicted prior to the law's
enactment.' 3 Despite the logic of these arguments, the Supreme Court
has steadfastly upheld these "public safety" statutes4 (as it has recently
with respect to sex offender registration laws, 5 which often invoke
similar constitutional criticism).
The Kansas SVP Act defines a sexually violent predator as "any
person who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent
offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality
disorder which makes the person likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual
violence.', 16 While the original version of the Kansas SVP Act explicitly
defined four classes of individuals to whom the act would apply," the
current version of the statute more generally applies to individuals
"presently confined"18 who meet the above-referenced statutory
definition of a "sexually violent predator."' 9 Neither the original scope
of the Kansas SVP Act nor the current reach of the law precludes its
applicability to individuals who unsuccessfully asserted an insanity
defense to the crime for which they were originally imprisoned.
Il. The Hypothetical Test Case
While this article revisits some of the previously mentioned
constitutional arguments, it focuses on the hypothetical case of an
individual whose insanity defense was rejected by a jury at the trial
stage and yet who was found to suffer from a mental abnormality just
12. See id. at 358.
13. See id. at 370-71.
14. See id. at 371; Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001); Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407
(2002).
15. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (rejecting an ex post facto challenge to
Alaska's sex offender registration act); Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1
(2003) (rejecting a due process challenge to Connecticut's sex offender registration act).
16. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (1994).
17. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a03(a) (1994) (stating that the Kansas SVP Act applies
to presently confined individuals convicted of a sexually violent offense who are scheduled
for release, individuals charged with a sexually violent offense who are found incompetent
to stand trial, individuals found not guilty by reason of insanity of a sexually violent
offense, and individuals found not guilty of a sexually violent offense because of a mental
disease or defect).
18. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a04(a) (1994).
19. Id.
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prior to completing his or her criminal sentence, thereby qualifying
for civil commitment under the Kansas SVP Act and similar statutes.
Essentially, in such a case, the individual was expressly deemed by a
jury not to have committed the sexual crime at issue as a result of his
or her mental condition. Nevertheless, the very same system that
sought to distinguish mental incapacity from criminal behavior at the
trial stage in order to exact criminal punishment may now, under the
scheme approved by the Court in Hendricks, seek to equate them
(often many years later") in order to prolong an individual's
incarceration.2' The cases decided by the Supreme Court involving
civil commitment of sexually violent predators have not dealt with
individuals who previously asserted an unsuccessful insanity defense.22
In such a case, a state's concurrent adoption of conflicting stances
demonstrates a lack of procedural consistency or any identifiable
guiding morality and should be barred by a due process analysis
informed by the protections embodied in double jeopardy and
collateral estoppel.
IV. Collateral Estoppel
The concept of collateral estoppel (also known as issue
preclusion), could pose an obstacle to the constitutionality of applying
sexually violent predator commitment schemes to individuals who
unsuccessfully assert an insanity defense and then face a re-
examination of the relationship between their mental health and past
criminal behavior in order to assess future dangerousness during a
civil commitment hearing. According to the doctrine of collateral
estoppel, a party to a civil action is barred from relitigating an issue
determined against that party in an earlier action (be it civil or
criminal 3), even if the second action differs significantly from the first
20. Justice Breyer alluded to the suspect timing of the initiation of civil commitment
hearings under the Kansas SVP Act in his dissent in Hendricks, noting that "when a State
believes that treatment does exist, and then couples that admission with a legislatively
required delay of such treatment until a person is at the end of his jail term (so that further
incapacitation is therefore necessary), such a legislative scheme begins to look punitive."
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 381 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
21. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346.
22. See id.; Seling, 531 U.S. 250; Crane, 534 U.S. 407; Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364
(1986).
23. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970) ("[I]t is much too late to suggest
that [collateral estoppel] is not fully applicable to a former judgment in a criminal
case...." (quoting United States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909, 913 (2d Cir. 1961))).
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one.2" Justice Stewart's majority opinion in Ashe v. Swenson" stated
that collateral estoppel "means simply that when an issue of ultimate
fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that
issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future
lawsuit." The Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 defines issue
preclusion in the following manner:
When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and
determined by a valid and final judgment, and the
determination is essential to the judgment, the determination
is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties,
whether on the same or a different claim. 6
Therefore, once the issue of mental capacity has been
determined in a criminal proceeding, that finding of fact should be
binding and, as a result, prohibited from being relitigated in a civil
action brought by the same opposing party (the state, in this case). In
such a hypothetical case, a jury would have found that the defendant's
mental condition was not the cause of his or her criminal behavior,
thereby rejecting such a link. Nevertheless, during the civil
commitment hearing, the criminal conviction for the defendant's past
sexual offense is the triggering event that launches a new inquiry into
his or her mental responsibility for criminal behavior. 7 Sexually
violent predator civil commitment statutes, therefore, may unjustly
provide for the relitigation of previously adjudicated issues in
violation of collateral estoppel.
The Supreme Court has never held that collateral estoppel in a
state civil action is directly mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause (or by any provision of the Bill of Rights and thus
incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause).' On the other hand, in Ashe, the Court held "the
24. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 108 (2d Pocket ed. 2001).
25. 397 U.S. at 443.
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982).
27. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 380 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Moreover, the Act, like
criminal punishment, imposes its confinement (or sanction) only upon an individual who
has previously committed a criminal offense .... [C]riminal behavior triggers the
Act .... ").
28. Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 471 (1958) ("Despite its wide employment, we
entertain grave doubts whether collateral estoppel can be regarded as a constitutional
requirement. Certainly this Court has never so held."). But see Benton v. Maryland, 395
U.S. 784, 795 (1969) ("Once it is decided that a particular Bill of Rights guarantee is
'fundamental to the American scheme of justice,' the same constitutional standards apply
against both the State and Federal Governments." (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145,149 (1968))).
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federal collateral estoppel rule to be an 'ingredient' of the Fifth
Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy and [applied] it to the
States through the Fourteenth Amendment .... ,29 Therefore,
collateral estoppel in the criminal context has been firmly entrenched
in state courts as a constitutionally mandated component of the Fifth
Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause for over thirty years.3°
V. Hendricks' Traditional Double Jeopardy Challenge to the
Kansas SVP Act
The Hendricks Court described the protections inherent in the
Double Jeopardy Clause in the following section of its opinion:
The Double Jeopardy Clause provides: "Nor shall any
person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb., 31 Although generally understood to
preclude a second prosecution for the same offense, the
Court has also interpreted this prohibition to prevent the
State from "punishing twice, or attempting a second time to
punish criminally, for the same offense." 32
Therefore, when considering a traditional double jeopardy
challenge, the Court must determine whether the proceedings in
question are criminal in nature and whether the aims or impact of the
proceedings constitute punishment.3 While it is undeniable that a
criminal prosecution for a sexually violent offense constitutes a
criminal proceeding that may result in punishment, the crux of
Hendricks' double jeopardy challenge was that the civil commitment
proceedings established by the Kansas SVP Act also constituted
criminal proceedings because of the punitive goal and effect of the
confinement resulting from the Kansas civil commitment scheme.
4
Courts employ a two-part, intent-effects test to determine
whether the provisions of a statute constitute punishment.35 The
intent prong of the test requires courts to inquire whether the
29. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 464 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also Benton, 395 U.S. at 794
("[Wie today find that the double jeopardy prohibition of the Fifth Amendment
represents a fundamental ideal in our constitutional heritage, and that it should apply to
the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.").
30. See generally Ashe, 397 U.S. 436.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. V.




35. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
legislature intended the statute to be punitive." If this analysis leads
to a finding that the legislative intent was punitive, the statute violates
the Double Jeopardy Clause, and the inquiry ends.37 If, on the other
hand, a court does not find the legislative intent to be punitive, the
test continues.38 The effects prong of the test involves seven factors,
often referred to as the Mendoza-Martinez factors, which seek to
ascertain whether a statute is so punitive in effect as to constitute
punishment, despite the professed non-punitive intent of the
legislature.39 Upon a showing that the statute's effects are punitive,
notwithstanding the legislature's civil intent, a double jeopardy claim
40
can bar further punishment.
In Hendricks, Justice Thomas, writing for a 5-4 majority, rejected
the defendant's double jeopardy claim, asserting that the Court was
"unpersuaded by Hendricks' argument that Kansas has established
criminal proceedings."'4' The Court determined that the proceedings,
established by the Kansas SVP Act, were not criminal because of the
law's professed civil intent ("to protect the public from harm, 42) and
its non-punitive effect.43 Absent a finding that the Kansas SVP Act's
civil commitment scheme equals a criminal prosecution or
punishment, the Court, over a vigorous dissent,' refused to accept the
36. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242,248 (1980).
37. See Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169. While the Mendoza-Martinez case did
not involve a double jeopardy challenge, the test outlined in Mendoza-Martinez to
determine whether a law is punitive has been used by the Court on a regular basis in order
to resolve double jeopardy and ex post facto challenges. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 97 ("In
analyzing the effects of the Act we refer to the seven factors noted in [Mendoza-Martinez]
as a useful framework. These factors, which migrated into our ex past facto case law from
double jeopardy jurisprudence, have their earlier origins in cases under the Sixth and
Eighth Amendments, as well as the Bill of Attainder and the Ex Post Facto Clauses.").
38. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169.
39. Id. at 168-69. The seven Mendoza-Martinez factors are: "[1] whether the sanction
involves an affirmative disability or restraint, [2] whether it has historically been regarded
as a punishment, [3] whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, [4] whether its
operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment -- retribution and deterrence,
[5] whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, [6] whether an alternative
purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and [71 whether it
appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned .... (footnotes omitted).
40. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 361-69 (noting that that while civil commitment does pose an affirmative
restraint, it does not, according to the Court, promote the traditional aims of punishment
and is "only potentially indefinite").
44. Four justices did not accept the Court's conclusion in this respect and found the
Kansas SVP Act to be a punitive measure. Id. at 394 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("I believe
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validity of a double jeopardy challenge to the Kansas SVP Act.
Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas pointed to Jones v.
United States,45 a case affirming the constitutionality of involuntary
civil commitment for individuals found not guilty by reason of
insanity, as precedent for subjecting individuals to consecutive
criminal and civil proceedings based on a single criminal offense. A
finding of not guilty by reason of insanity is reasonable evidence of a
mental condition that renders an individual potentially ripe for civil
commitment, which is sufficient to trigger involuntary commitment or
a hearing to make such a determination. In fact, had Hendricks
been found not guilty by reason of insanity, it is doubtful that a
challenge on his behalf would have reached the Court's docket,
especially considering the holding in Jones.48 However, because Jones
applies only when a jury has explicitly found a connection between a
defendant's lack of mental responsibility and criminal behavior, both
Hendricks' double jeopardy claim and that of the hypothetical
defendant at issue in this note raise questions for which Jones does
not offer a solution. Nevertheless, current Supreme Court cases have
rejected traditional double jeopardy challenges to sexually violent
predator civil commitment statutes.
VI. Using Collateral Estoppel and Double Jeopardy to
Wage a New Due Process Challenge
Even if one accepts the Court's conclusion that the proceedings
created by the Kansas SVP Act neither constitute criminal
proceedings nor impose punishment, one could still make the
argument that sexually violent predator civil commitment statutes
implicate the spirit and purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment in such a manner as to trigger closer scrutiny under
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
As noted above, the concept of double jeopardy incorporates that of
the Act before us involves an affirmative restraint historically regarded as punishment;
imposed upon behavior already a crime after a finding of scienter; which restraint, namely
confinement, serves a traditional aim of punishment, does not primarily serve an
alternative purpose (such as treatment) and is excessive in relation to any alternative
purpose assigned.").
45. 463 U.S. 354 (1984).
46. Hendricks, 463 U.S. at 369 (retying oan Jones, 463 U.S. at 366).
47. Jones, 463 U.S. at 366 ("It comports with common sense to conclude that
someone whose mental illness was sufficient to lead him to commit a criminal act is likely
to remain ill and in need of treatment.").
48. Id.
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collateral estoppel.49 In Palma v. Powers," which is cited in the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments section 27, the District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois, relying on Supreme Court and other
federal court precedent, held:
The concept of issue preclusion has been applied on the basis
of a prior criminal conviction in a substantial number of civil
suits. Since issue preclusion is applicable in both criminal
and civil litigation, there would seem to be no viable reason
to bar its application in a civil suit simply because the initial
litigation was in a criminal court. The rationale underlying
preclusion generally supports its application regardless of the
type of litigation involved. 1
Therefore, collateral estoppel can be invoked even when the first
proceeding is a criminal trial and the second one is a civil action.
While it is true that the Supreme Court has never extended the
double jeopardy protection to situations in which the second
proceeding is expressly civil, the Court "repeatedly has recognized
that commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation
of liberty that requires due process protection." 2  If a situation is
serious enough to trigger strict scrutiny under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments' Due Process Clauses, particularly with
respect to an involuntary and potentially indefinite deprivation of
individual liberty, then such a situation should likewise merit review
from a double jeopardy perspective, so long as at least one of the
proceedings is criminal in nature, and the state is a party to both
actions. 3  In the context of sexually violent predator civil
49. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 445-46.
50. 295 F.Supp. 924 (N.D. I11. 969).
51. Id. at 933-34 (citing Local 167 Int'l Bd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen &
Helpers of Am. v. United States, 291 U.S. 293, 298 (1934); United States v. Gramling, 180
F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1950); Austin v. United States, 125 F.2d 816, 818-19 (7th Cir. 1942);
O'Neill v. United States, 198 F. Supp. 367, 369-70 (E.D. N.Y. 1961); Teitelbaum Furs, Inc.
v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 601, 606-07 (1962); Hurtt v. Stirone, 416 Pa. 493 (1965) in
support of the statement that "issue preclusion has been applied on the basis of a prior
criminal conviction in a substantial number of civil suits.").
52. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).
53. Requiring at least one of the proceedings to be criminal in nature avoids the
problem of not being able to subject appropriate individuals to multiple civil commitments
stemming from the same or similar actions, behaviors, and states of mind. I do not dispute
that involuntary civil commitment, even on a recurring basis, may serve a legitimate
governmental interest and does not violate due process or double jeopardy in its ordinary
use outside of reliance on criminal convictions. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 426 ("The state
has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in providing care to its citizens
who are unable because of emotional disorders to care for themselves; the state also has
authority under its police power to protect the community from the dangerous tendencies
[Vol. 32:4
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commitment, where the line between criminal and civil incarceration
has become increasingly blurred, constitutional challenges on due
process grounds should be informed by the Court's double jeopardy
jurisprudence. Such an approach would mark an important step
toward preventing the government from justifying the application of
inconsistent mental responsibility standards by hiding behind a fast-
eroding distinction between criminal and civil proceedings.
There are three main components to collateral estoppel: (1) the
issues of law or fact involved in a later case must be identical to issues
of law or fact presented in an earlier case; (2) those issues must have
been actually litigated and decided in the earlier case; and (3) the
decision concerning those issues must have been a necessary and
integral part in arriving at the final judgment on the merits in the
earlier case.54 Moreover, unlike res judicata55 (also known as claim
preclusion), collateral estoppel prohibits relitigation of issues actually
litigated and determined in the earlier suit, regardless of whether the
first suit was based on the same cause of action as the second suit.56 It
is also irrelevant to the applicability of collateral estoppel that the two
cases involve different claims and employ different legal theories.57
The public policy rationale behind collateral estoppel is
straightforward. "Collateral estoppel, like the related doctrine of res
judicata, has the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden
of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy and
of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.
' '5 8
With respect to the promotion of judicial economy, the systematic
interests addressed by collateral estoppel arguably remain the same
whether the proceeding is a tort action for damages or a civil
of some who are mentally ill.").
54. James Talcott, Inc. v. Allahabad Bank, Ltd., 444 F.2d 451, 458-59 (5th Cir. 1971).
55. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.5 (1979) ("Under the
doctrine of res judicata, a judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars a second suit
involving the same parties or their privies based on the same cause of action. Under the
doctrine of collateral estoppel, on the other hand, the second action is upon a different
cause of action and the judgment in the prior suit precludes relitigation of issues actually
litigated and necessary to the outcome of the first action.").
56. Lawlor v. Nat'l Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955).
57. Id.
58. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 326.; cf. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957)
(noting that the similar rationale behind double jeopardy is that "the State with all its
resources and power [shall] not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an
individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and
ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity.").
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commitment hearing. 9  The conservation of judicial resources,
particularly time and money, is not inherently related to a particular
cause of action. On the other hand, the protections collateral
estoppel affords civil defendants do vary according to the nature of
the cause of action. In the ordinary civil action, collateral estoppel
prevents an individual (or entity) from relitigating an issue already
determined in an earlier proceeding, saving the parties and the courts
time and money.60 In the context of civil commitment, however, there
is a third and even more pressing concern that collateral estoppel
preserves: personal liberty. The ordinary civil litigant does not risk
the prospect of losing his or her freedom when forced to stand trial.
But a defendant facing involuntary civil commitment always
confronts this very real possibility.6  For this reason, collateral
estoppel offers its most precious protection in the civil commitment
setting - the rare occasion in which a defendant to a civil action
confronts a potential loss of liberty in the form of involuntary
confinement.62
VII. Criminal Insanity Defense - Mental
Responsibility Standards
Most states apply one of two mental responsibility standards
when a defendant raises an insanity defense during a criminal trial.
The relevant determination under either of the two major insanity
defense schemes is the defendant's mental culpability in connection
with the criminal act for which he or she stands accused. To
demonstrate the two different criminal insanity defense standards and
their interaction with sexually violent predator civil commitment
statutes, this article uses Kansas and Wisconsin as model jurisdictions.
These two states have similar sexually violent predator statutes, but
offer competing approaches to criminal insanity defenses.
Kansas, like most jurisdictions in the United States," follows the
59. See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 326.
60. Id. at 328.
61. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,425 (1979).
62. Id.
63. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT
ORGANIZATIONS, 257-59 tbl.38 (1998). According to this report from the U.S.
Department of Justice, as of 1998, twenty-five states and the federal court system follow
the M'Naghten rule or a modified form of it. Twenty-one states and the District of
Columbia follow the Model Penal Code/American Law Institute formulation of the
insanity defense. New Hampshire is the lone state to follow the Durham "Product" test.
Three states (Idaho, Montana, and Utah) do not offer an insanity defense.
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M'Naghten64 formulation of the insanity defense." The Kansas
Supreme Court, quoting the original nineteenth century British
M'Naghten case, has held that in Kansas:
[T]he test of mental responsibility is whether the accused
"was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease
of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act
he was doing; or if he did know it, that he did not know he
was doing what was wrong." It is important to note that the
M'Naghten rule has two branches. The accused is to be held
not criminally responsible (1) where he does not know the
nature and quality of his act, or in the alternative, (2) where
he does not know right from wrong with respect to that act.66
Kansas, therefore, like the other states that rely on M'Naghten,
adheres to a cognition-based test of insanity.67 The question of
insanity hinges on whether the defendant has a mental "defect" or
"disease" that inhibited his or her ability to distinguish right from
wrong in relation to the alleged crime.6
The other commonly employed insanity defense stems from the
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code insanity defense
("ALI") test.69 In 1966, the Wisconsin Supreme Court endorsed the
use of the ALI insanity defense test in a Wisconsin trial court for the
first time.70 Four years later, the Wisconsin legislature codified the
ALI test and adopted the following statutory definition of the insanity
defense: "A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the
64. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
65. State v. Boan, 686 P.2d 160, 167 (Kan. 1984).
66. Id. (quoting M'Naghten, 8 Eng. Rep. 718).
67. See Boan, 686 P.2d at 167. This article refers to the Boan test as cognition-based
because Boan asks whether the defendant "[knew] the nature and quality of the act he was
doing .... Id. Cognition, as defined in the dictionary, is "the act or process of
knowing .... THE RANDOM HOUSE DICrIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 287
(Jess Stein ed. 1966).
68. Boan, 686 P.2d at 167.
69. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) ("A person is not
responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease
or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality (or alternatively,
wrongfulness) of his conduct (cognitive standard) or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law (volitional standard).").
70. State v. Shoffner, 143 N.W.2d 458, 465 (Wis. 1966). Interestingly, the court did
not embrace the ALl test as the only form of the insanity defense to be applied in
Wisconsin. Instead, the court provided defendants with the option of asserting a defense
based on the M'Naghten test, for which the burden of proof would be on the state, or
asserting an affirmative defense based on the ALl test, for which the burden of proof
would be on the defendant. When the state legislature later adopted the ALI test as the
sole insanity defense in Wisconsin, the burden of proof remained with the defendant.
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.15(3) (1998),
time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect the person
lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of
his or her conduct or conform his or her conduct to the requirements
of law."71
While the first portion of the statutory language encompasses the
cognitive inquiry derived from the M'Naghten test (whether the
defendant could differentiate between the rightfulness and
wrongfulness of his or her conduct), the second half of the
formulation takes into account the defendant's ability to control his
or her behavior as a result of his or her mental capacity.72 Therefore,
if a defendant asserts a lack of sufficient capacity to control his or her
actions as an excuse for the criminal act with which he or she is
charged, juries in Wisconsin criminal courts must take into
consideration the volitional analysis forbidden in Kansas and other
M'Naghten states.73
VIII. ALl Jurisdictions - The Wisconsin Model
The best jurisdiction to test the application of a new due process
test incorporating elements of collateral estoppel and double
jeopardy would be a state in which the trial court insanity defense
standard mirrors the standard at play in the civil commitment setting.
Because every state statute that provides for civil commitment of
sexually violent predators nearing completion of their criminal
sentences contains the volitional control language of the Kansas SVP
Act, that ideal model jurisdiction would be one like Wisconsin, which
has a civil commitment statute for sexually violent offenders and
follows the ALI insanity defense test in criminal trials. Therefore,
this note uses Wisconsin law to illustrate how collateral estoppel
could be applied to prevent the civil commitment of sexually violent
offenders who previously unsuccessfully pursued a criminal insanity
defense in an ALI jurisdiction.
Wisconsin's statute authorizing the civil commitment of "sexually
violent persons" ("the Wisconsin SVP Act") took effect on June 2,
1994.7' The law defines a sexually violent person as someone
who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense, has
been adjudicated delinquent for a sexually violent offense, or
has been found not guilty or not responsible for a sexually
71. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.15(1).
72. Id.
73. See id.; Boan, 686 P.2d at 167.
74. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.13 (1998).
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violent offense by reason of insanity or mental disease,
defect or illness, and who is dangerous because he or she
suffers from a mental disorder that makes it substantially
probable7 1 that the person will engage in acts of sexual
violence.
Like the Kansas SVP Act, the Wisconsin SVP Act consists of
four primary components: (1) past criminal sexual conduct; (2) a
mental health abnormality; (3) a lack of control resulting from that
mental health condition; and (4) a determination that, absent state
intervention, future criminal sexual conduct is highly likely due to the
combination of the previous three elements.76
On the surface, this constructi6n of the Wisconsin SVP Act
appears to parallel the volitional prong of the ALI insanity defense
test.77  In fact, the Supreme Court's own description of why the
Kansas SVP Act meets due process requirements also seems to
comport with the ALI test.8 In Hendricks, the Court stated that the
Kansas SVP Act did not deprive defendants of due process because it
requires a finding of future dangerousness based on "evidence of past
sexually violent behavior and a present mental condition that creates
a likelihood of such conduct in the future if the person is not
incapacitated., 79 The Wisconsin SVP Act's reliance on past criminal
behavior and mental capacity mirrors much of the state's criminal
insanity defense.' Upon closer inspection, however, there exist
superficial differences between the governing statutes. As noted
above, in order for collateral estoppel to be invoked, the issue
litigated in both settings (mental responsibility in the criminal and
civil commitment settings) must be identical. 8' Therefore, these
discrepancies demand further analysis.
75. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.01(7) (2003).
76. Id.; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (2003).
77. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.15(1) (1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 980.01(7); see also
DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE LAW
30 (1999) ("The Hendricks Court thus seems to have reinserted the volitional prong [of
the insanity defense] into the [civil commitment) legal standard.").
78. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357 (1997).
79. Id.
80. While it is true that the Court in Hendricks refers to a "present" mental condition,
the defendant's mental condition at a civil commitment hearing is generally analyzed in
relation to past criminal behavior. Therefore, except for situations in which an
individual's mental capacity has significantly deteriorated during incarceration, this
temporal element should not be given too much weight and would probably be better
described as requiring a "continuing" mental abnormality as opposed to a "present" one.
81. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982); James Talcott, Inc. v.
Allahabad Bank, Ltd., 444 F.2d 451, 458-59 (5th Cir. 1971).
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Under the Wisconsin SVP Act, "'antisocial personality disorder'
is sufficiently precise to satisfy the criterion of 'mental disorder."'' 2
On the other hand, Section 2 of Wisconsin's ALl insanity defense test
explicitly states that "the terms 'mental disease or defect' do not
include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or
otherwise antisocial conduct." ' Therefore, the question arises as to
whether the statutory language of Wisconsin's ALI test categorically
excludes antisocial personality disorders from a valid insanity
defense. If Wisconsin's ALI test affirmatively prevents an insanity
defense premised on antisocial personality disorders, while the
Wisconsin SVP Act has been held to allow for civil commitment in
reliance on such conditions, 4 then the collateral estoppel "identical
issue" requirement might not be met in civil commitment proceedings
based on antisocial personality disorders, which are frequently the
bases of the civil commitment of sex offenders.'
In State v. Werlein,86 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals addressed
this very question. In response to a strict construction of the
Wisconsin ALI test, which would have barred an insanity defense
based on an antisocial personality disorder, the court noted the
following:
We do not construe Simpson87 to exclude every diagnosis of
an antisocial personality disorder from the definition of
mental disease or defect. Section 971.15 was drafted so as to
define within broad terms the considerations under which a
defendant would not be held responsible for his criminal
conduct. The statute specifically refrains from resorting to
labels that would place a defendant's disorder in a certain
category and then have such categorization determine the
outcome of the inquiry.
In enacting sec. 971.15, the legislature could have excluded
antisocial personality disorders as a mental disease or defect
82. State v. Adams, 588 N.W.2d 336, 341 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998).
83. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.15(2) (1998).
84. Adams, 588 N.W.2d at 341.
85. See Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 414 (2002) ("[O]ur cases suggest that civil
commitment of dangerous sexual offenders will normally involve individuals who find it
particularly difficult to control their behavior .... "). In Crane, Michael Crane's
classification as a sexually violent predator was based on expert testimony that he suffered
from an "antisocial personality disorder." Id. at 411. Additionally, in a Supreme Court
case challenging Washington's SVP law, Andre Brigham Young was deemed a sexually
violent predator upon a finding that he suffered from "a severe personality disorder."
Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 256 (2001).
86. 401 N.W.2d 848 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
87. Simpson v. State, 215 N.W.2d 435 (Wis. 1974).
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if it wished to do so. However, the legislature refrained from
doing so and instead permitted a case-by-case determination
to be made as to whether a specific disorder rose to the level
of a mental disease or defect. By so doing, the legislature
evinced its intent that categorization and labels placed on a
disorder are not to be determinative of a defendant's
responsibility for a crime.
Many states, including Wisconsin, have attempted to deal
with the complex question of when a defendant's mental
condition will absolve the defendant from responsibility for
his criminal conduct. Wisconsin has chosen to recognize that
certain mental conditions will be a defense to criminal
responsibility but has also chosen to exclude from those
conditions sociopathic personalities that are evinced only by
criminal or other antisocial conduct. Medical diagnoses do
not fit neatly within the requirements of law, nor do the
requirements of law embrace or embody the nomenclature
of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of mental disorders.
These conflicts are to be reconciled at a jury trial by the
citizens selected for this most important duty.
In essence, the court held that evidence proving that a defendant
suffers from an antisocial personality disorder is not per se
insufficient to sustain an insanity defense. 89 Admittedly, the pursuit of
such an avenue would be more difficult than establishing an insanity
defense based on a mental condition less commonly associated with
antisocial conduct. Nevertheless, the door remains open for a
defendant to travel this uphill path.'
If the justice system is to adhere to a consistent and identifiable
procedural morality, the wholesale exclusion of antisocial personality
disorders from the insanity defense cannot coexist with either: (1) a
scheme that allows the government to base the civil commitment of
sexually violent predators on such disorders; or (2) the ALI insanity
defense itself. The Court's acknowledgement in Hendricks91 and
Crane' that antisocial personality disorders can be accurate
predictors of future dangerousness (because of the resulting inability
88. Werlein, 401 N.W.2d at 852.
89. Id.
90. See id.
91. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997) ("The precommitment requirement
of a 'mental abnormality' or 'personality disorder' is consistent with the requirements of
these other statutes that we have upheld in that it narrows the class of persons eligible for
confinement to those who are unable to control their dangerousness.").
92. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 410 (2002) (restating the Hendricks rationale for
permitting reliance on personality disorders).
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to control one's actions) undermines the rationale behind refusing to
exculpate a defendant at the trial court level who is able to
demonstrate that an antisocial personality disorder prevented him or
her from conforming his or her conduct to the requirements of the
law.93 Moreover, the ALl insanity defense test is premised on the
very notion that mental responsibility can be directly related to one's
ability (or inability) to conform one's actions to the requirements of
the law.9 If courts and legislatures believe that there is enough of a
correlation between a lack of control resulting from an antisocial
personality disorder and sexually violent criminal behavior to justify
civilly committing someone, then a criminal defendant should be able
to rely on that judicial or legislative finding to support an insanity
defense, which, if successfully argued, in most cases would also lead to
civil commitment.9 For the sake of consistency and fairness, as
guaranteed by due process,96 either personality disorders should be
expressly permitted to serve as the foundation of an ALI criminal
insanity defense or they should be prohibited from functioning as the
primary justification for the civil commitment of sexually violent
offenders.'
If the mental disorder at issue during both a criminal trial and a
subsequent civil commitment proceeding is the same, then one
element of collateral estoppel's identity of issues requirement is
satisfied. 98 However, a discrepancy between the required standards
and/or burdens of proof at the respective hearings could buttress an
argument that the issues were not "identical" or were not "actually
93. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.15(1) (2005).
94. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (2001).
95. See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 366 (1984).
96. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) ("By requiring the government
to follow appropriate procedures when its agents decide to 'deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property,' the Due Process Clause promotes fairness in such decisions.").
97. If state governments were truly interested in committing potentially dangerous
sex offenders after completion of their criminal sentences in order to protect the public
and provide treatment (and not to exact further retribution), then forcing the government
to operate within more consistent mental responsibility standards at the criminal trial and
civil commitment levels would lead to additional mutually acceptable (to both defendants
and prosecutors) insanity pleas in criminal trials. Given the fact that civil commitment
provides for indefinite detention, prosecutors could satisfy the concerns of people seeking
longer confinement as well as people advocating for treatment over punishment by
accepting more insanity pleas, particularly in cases where the potential criminal sentence
would be shorter than the likely length of a civil commitment.
98. See James Talcott, Inc. v. Allahabad Bank, Ltd. 444 F.2d 451, 458-59 (5th Cir.
1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982).
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litigated."'9 For example, if the standard of proof regarding a
particular issue at a second hearing is lower than that of an earlier
hearing, failure to satisfy that standard at the first proceeding does
not foreclose satisfying the lower standard of proof in the latter
proceeding.1° It is for this reason that collateral estoppel does not
preclude a finding of individual liability at a wrongful death hearing
subsequent to a not guilty verdict at that same person's murder trial."'
Conversely, however, if the required standard of proof were higher in
the second case, collateral estoppel prevents the relitigation of a
particular issue already decided adversely to the moving party in the
earlier action." Logically, if there is not enough evidence for a jury
to find liability applying a preponderance of the evidence standard,
then there certainly is not enough evidence to find proof of liability
beyond a reasonable doubt.0 3
Essential elements of a criminal charge must be proven by the
prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt." On the other hand, in
Wisconsin, the introduction of a "[m]ental disease or defect ... is an
affirmative defense which the defendant must establish to a
reasonable certainty by the greater weight of credible evidence."' 5
Therefore, the threshold defendants must overcome in order to
proffer a successful insanity defense is lower than the rigorous
reasonable doubt burden to which the prosecution is bound in order
to achieve a conviction in criminal court.'O While this "reasonable
certainty by the greater weight of credible evidence" standard may
"ease" the onus on criminal defendants exercising an insanity
99. See Talcott, 444 F.2d at 458-59 (incorrectly citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982). Section 28(4) actually addresses this issue. See In Interest of
T.M.S., 152 Wis.2d 345, 448 N.W.2d 282 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989)).
100. See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397 (1938) ("The difference in degree of
the burden of proof in criminal and civil cases precludes application of the doctrine of res
judicata. The acquittal was 'merely... an adjudication that the proof was not sufficient to
overcome all reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused."' (quoting Lewis v. Frick, 233
U.S. 291, 302 (1914))). Although Helvering specifically refers to res judicata, the logic of
its holding can be extrapolated to collateral estoppel, as the same concerns are at play with
respect to standards and burdens of proof.
101. See Helvering, 303 U.S. at 397.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970) ("[Plroof of a criminal charge beyond a
reasonable doubt is constitutionally required.").
105. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.15(3) (2005).
106. See id.; Winship, 397 U.S. 358.
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defense, °7 it concurrently raises the burden on the prosecution,
should it choose to challenge an insanity defense based on credible
evidence.08  Instead of just rebutting the defendant's affirmative
defense by showing that the defendant has failed to establish insanity
beyond a reasonable doubt, the prosecution faces the more difficult
task of demonstrating that the defendant did not even reach the lower
reasonable certainty standard.'O To do so, the prosecution must not
only inject a modicum of reasonable doubt into the minds of the jury,
but also must eliminate the possibility of a reasonable certainty that
the defendant is not mentally responsible for his or her actions."'
In contrast to the criminal insanity defense standard of proof
requirements, when seeking to civilly commit a sexually violent
person, Wisconsin law requires the state to prove all elements of its
petition beyond a reasonable doubt, including the defendant's mental
disorder."' Therefore, if the prosecution at a criminal trial
successfully defeats the defendant's claim that he or she was not
mentally responsible to a reasonable certainty, why then should the
prosecution be able to contradict its own position at a subsequent
civil commitment hearing in order to assert at a later date that the
defendant's mental health prevents conformity with the requirements
of the law beyond a reasonable doubt? The logical inconsistency
between the two positions should serve as a bar to relitigation of the
defendant's mental responsibility.
As noted above, the state does not have to offer evidence of its
own to rebut the defendant's mental health evidence at the criminal
trial level."2 Thus, not only are the standards of proof distinct, but so,
too, are the respective burdens of proof."3 The state, in arguing that
the issue of mental responsibility has not been "actually litigated,"
might contend that because the burden of proof is on the defendant,
107. Use of the word "ease" should not be construed to imply that making out a
successful insanity defense is easy. According to a 1991 study funded by the National
Institute of Mental Health, only 26 percent of insanity pleas are successful, and 80 percent
of those successful insanity pleas were cases in which the prosecution and defense agreed
on the appropriateness of the insanity plea before trial.
http://www.psych.org/public/public info/insanity.cfm.
108. Gibson v. State, 197 N.W.2d 813, 818 (1972) (holding that the state does not have
to produce evidence contradicting an insanity defense, as the burden is on the defendant).
109. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.15(3).
110. Id.
111. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 980.05(3)(a) (West 2005).
112. Gibson, 197 N.W.2d at 818.
113. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.15(3); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.05(3)(a).
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the state has never affirmatively sought to comment on the
defendant's mental responsibility, particularly if the state opts not to
rebut the defendant's insanity defense at all. Such an argument
ignores the concept of mens rea, a fundamental premise of criminal
law that requires proof of a guilty state of mind to successfully
prosecute a criminal offense."' Even though the burden is on the
defendant to offer an affirmative defense that his or her mental
disorder inhibited his or her ability to conform his or her conduct to
the requirements of the law, the state's failure (or conscious decision
not) to rebut such evidence with mental health evidence of its own
cannot be viewed as not having contested the defendant's mental
culpability; the very prosecution of criminal charges against the
defendant underscores the state's intent to prove the defendant's
mental responsibility for his or her behavior."5
To illustrate this point, imagine that the American criminal
justice system were not premised on the notion of presumed
innocence (but that the Constitution's double jeopardy protection
remained intact). What if all "not guilty" pleas were affirmative
defenses, which the prosecution were not required to rebut? Surely,
double jeopardy could not coexist with a system in which the
government could strategically choose not to contest the affirmative
defense of "not guilty" in order to reserve the right to relitigate the
case at a later date. A tactical choice against rebutting a defendant's
case should not be without consequence and certainly should not
redound to the benefit of the prosecution in the form of a second
chance. Along those lines, meeting an insanity defense with a
strategic silence should not provide the state with an opportunity to
take the opposite position with respect to the defendant's mental
state at a subsequent judicial inquiry.
The final prong of the collateral estoppel test is whether the issue
of mental responsibility was a necessary and integral part in arriving
at the judgment in the earlier case."6  This last question is less
controversial than the preceding ones. Had the jury accepted the
defendant's insanity defense during the criminal trial, he or she could
114. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952) ("The contention that an
injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient
notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of
the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose
between good and evil.").
115. See id.
116. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982); James Talcott, Inc. v.
Allahabad Bank, Ltd., 444 F.2d 451, 458-459 (5th Cir. 1971).
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not have been convicted of the sexual offense with which he or she
was charged."7 Rejecting the defendant's insanity defense subjected
the defendant to criminal sanctions."8 As a result, there is little doubt
that the issue of mental responsibility was a necessary and integral
part in arriving at the judgment in the criminal trial.
The close relationship between the insanity defense and the
ultimate disposition of the case is particularly true in a state like
Wisconsin, which provides for a bi-furcated trial when a defendant
raises an insanity defense."19 In Wisconsin, juries do not consider an
insanity defense until after they have already found the defendant
guilty of a crime, whereupon a second hearing will be held solely to
determine the defendant's mental responsibility.20 There can be little
doubt, then, that the inquiry into the link between the defendant's
mental state and criminal behavior has been adjudicated with finality
and forms a necessary and integral part in arriving at the final
judgment.
The ALI insanity defense test and sexually violent predator civil
commitment statutes contain parallel analyses of the defendant's level
of volitional control with respect to his or her past criminal conduct. 2'
The uniformity of these inquiries, the mutuality of the parties
involved, the fact that the inquiry was conclusively adjudicated at the
earlier criminal trial, and the relevance of the inquiry to the judgment
in the first proceeding all satisfy the requirements of collateral
estoppel .
Collateral estoppel is a necessary tool to prevent the government
from presenting contradictory arguments aimed at indefinitely
incarcerating individuals past the length of their prescribed prison
terms. If mental responsibility determinations are adjudicated
according to the ALI standard in a civil tort action, then the doctrine
of collateral estoppel bars the plaintiff in the first trial from
relitigating that issue in a subsequent tort proceeding.123 And yet a
117. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.165(3)(b) (West 1998).
118. See id. § 971.165(3)(a).
119. See id. § 971.165(1) ("If a defendant couples a plea of not guilty by reason of
mental disease or defect: (a) There shall be a separation of the issues with a sequential
order of proof in a continuous trial. The plea of not guilty shall be determined first and
the plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect shall be determined second.").
120. See id.
121. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.15(1); see also WiS. STAT. ANN. § 980.01(7).
122. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27; Talcott, 444 F.2d at 458-459.
123. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27; see also Talcott, 444 F.2d at
458-459.
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civil commitment defendant does not receive a comparable safeguard
when faced with potential confinement. This inconsistency has the
bizarre effect of actually providing defendants who face the prospect
of physical confinement with less stringent protections than
defendants who face mere monetary damages. 124  The Wisconsin
framework, which perpetuates such an irrational distinction, is
repugnant to the liberty which due process is meant to protect and is
unconstitutional.
IX. M'Naghten Jurisdictions - The Kansas Model
Kansas follows the M'Naghten criminal insanity defense test.2 '
Because M'Naghten eschews the volitional control analysis found in
the ALI test, the question of whether the issue of law or fact involved
in the civil commitment hearing in Kansas is identical to the issue of
law or fact presented in the preceding criminal trial poses a greater
hurdle to the application of collateral estoppel than the Wisconsin
model.26
In order to fulfill the initial collateral estoppel "identical issue"
requirement, the Kansas SVP Act would have had to predicate its
determination regarding whether to civilly commit the defendant on
the same inquiry made into the relationship between the defendant's
conduct and his or her mental condition during the criminal trial.'27
As previously noted, the Kansas SVP Act defines a sexually violent
predator as "any person who has been convicted of or charged with a
sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or
personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in
repeat acts of sexual violence."'28 The Kansas SVP Act offers the
following definition of "mental abnormality:" "a congenital or
acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity
which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a
degree constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of
others."'29  Viewed in isolation, it is difficult to gauge what role
cognition plays in the Kansas SVP Act mental abnormality standard.
124. See United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 87 (1916) ("It cannot be that the
safeguards of the person, so often and so rightly mentioned with solemn reverence, are
less than those that protect from a liability in debt.").
125. State v. Boan, 686 P.2d 160, 167 (Kan. 1984).
126. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27; Talcott, 444 F.2d at 458-459.
127. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27; Talcott, 444 F.2d at 458-459.
128. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (1994).
129. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (1994).
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The Court has twice provided guidance as to how to interpret this
text. 3° In Hendricks, the Court was reluctant to require an exact
correlation of legal and medical terms to characterize the mental
impairment necessary to trigger civil commitment in accordance with
due process. 31  Therefore, facially, the fact that Kansas criminal trial
courts employ a standard based on mental "defects or disease" while
civil commitment proceedings focus on whether a defendant suffers
from a mental "abnormality" does not necessarily create mutually
exclusive analyses. Both standards require mental health experts to
diagnose and explain a mental health condition that impairs the
defendant's conduct.
32
The inquiry becomes more complicated when considering the
requisite effect that the mental condition at issue must have on the
defendant's actions and the relationship between cognition and
volition. The Kansas criminal court insanity defense standard
requires a showing that the mental disease or defect inhibits the
defendant's ability to distinguish right conduct from wrong conduct.
1 3
In contrast, in the civil commitment setting the mental abnormality
must affect the emotional or volitional capacity of the defendant in
such a manner as to render him or her likely to commit a sexually
violent offense. 3" The Kansas SVP Act is silent as to the cognitive
question inherent in the M'Naghten standard, containing no overt
discussion of right and wrong.'35 Instead, the inquiry appears to hinge
on the intersection of the defendant's mental health and the
defendant's likelihood of committing one of the proscribed acts, as a
result of either a volitional or emotional abnormality. 6 Because the
Court has yet to rule on the requisite manifestation of an emotional
abnormality necessary to trigger commitment under the Kansas SVP
Act,37 the Court's current jurisprudence in this area centers solely on
130. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997); Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407
(2002).
131. 521 U.S. at 359-360 ("[T]he term 'mental illness' is devoid of any talismanic
significance.... [W]e have never required State legislatures to adopt any particular
nomenclature in drafting civil commitment statutes.... Legal definitions.., need not
mirror those advanced by the medical profession.").
132. Boan, 686 P.2d at 167; Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 359-360.
133. Boan, 686 P.2d at 167.
134. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b).
135. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01-21 (1994); Boan, 686 P.2d at 167.
136. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b); Crane, 534 U.S. at 413.
137. Crane, 534 U.S. at 415 ("The Court in Hendricks had no occasion to consider
whether confinement based solely on 'emotional' abnormality would be constitutional,
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the notion of a volitional abnormality.138 Seeking to refine its "lack of
control" articulation of a volitional abnormality first asserted in the
Hendricks case,139 the Court, in Crane, subsequently stated that "[i]t is
enough to say that there must be proof of serious difficulty in
controlling behavior."'"
If the state were to argue during a civil commitment hearing that
an individual (who unsuccessfully asserted a M'Naghten insanity
defense to a sex crime) possesses a mental abnormality that inhibits
his or her ability to distinguish right from wrong, so as to make him or
her likely to engage in criminal sexual behavior, then such a
prosecution should clearly be barred by collateral estoppel. In such a
case, the issue of mental responsibility would be identical in both
settings. However, while an inability to control one's behavior may
include the inability to distinguish right from wrong, cognitional
impairment is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for a
finding of volition impairment. An individual whose insanity defense
is rejected in a Kansas state criminal court (because a jury found the
defendant capable of distinguishing right from wrong) may still suffer
from the volitional impairment required to trigger civil commitment
under the Kansas SVP Act, thus potentially protecting the state from
collateral estoppel claims.
From the standpoint of procedural morality, however, any
inquiry into the relationship between mental health and its
relationship to an individual's criminal behavior (and culpability)
should be enough to meet collateral estoppel's identity of issues
requirement. To allow otherwise means that, despite a jury's
evidentiary finding that a defendant had the mental capacity to be
morally responsible for his or her criminal conduct, states may rely on
the very same evidence in proving that the defendant's mental health
justifies civil commitment.14 In essence, in M'Naghten jurisdictions,
the state may contradict its previous assertion of mental responsibility
to prolong the individual's involuntary detention on a theory of a lack
of volitional control - an avenue intentionally made unavailable to
the defendant during the preceding criminal trial.
Despite the arguably more compelling legal argument with
and we likewise have no occasion to do so in the present case.").
138. Crane, 534 U.S. 407; Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346; Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250
(2001).
139. 521 U.S. at 358.
140. 534 U.S. at 413.
141. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358.
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respect to ALI states, the moral inconsistency of the different mental
responsibility standards in criminal trials and civil commitment
hearings in M'Naghten jurisdictions is still pronounced. Legislatures
and judges are turning a blind eye to the irreconcilability of the
standards at play, allowing the government to argue on the one hand
that a criminal defendant has the mental capacity to tell right from
wrong (and should therefore face imprisonment), only to then turn
around and argue later that the defendant does not have the mental
capacity to avoid committing similar offenses, and should therefore
be indefinitely confined to a mental institution.
Indeed, looking to the development of mental responsibility
standards within Kansas itself demonstrates the generational
inconsistency which lies at the heart of procedural immorality.
Rejecting the competing standard upon which the ALI model is based
in State v. Andrews, the Kansas Supreme Court justified its narrow
view of criminal insanity by noting "at the present time, there is no
better rule for the protection of society."'42 In State v. Lucas, a case
relied on heavily by Andrews, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted
even more explicitly, "Until such time as we are convinced by a firm
foundation in scientific fact that a test for criminal responsibility other
than M'Naghten will serve the basic end of our criminal
jurisprudence, i.e., the protection of society from grievous anti-social
acts, we shall adhere to it.,,143 Ironically, the Kansas Supreme Court,
and other jurisdictions upon which it has relied, legitimize their
restrictive insanity defense standards with the very public safety
rationales that the civil commitment statutes directly address. The
Hendricks decision, by allowing states the sweeping power to
indefinitely detain individuals who exhibit "serious difficulty in
controlling behavior," ' 4 obviates the need for restrictive insanity
standards in the name of protecting the public. Yet despite the
evolution of the law, in Kansas the conflicting procedural standards
remain. The only discernible guiding morality for such a system is
that the ends justify the means - a notion abhorrent to the many
individual protections afforded by the very notion of due process.
142. 357 P.2d 739, 747 (Kan. 1960).
143. 152 A.2d 37, 50 (N.J. 1959).
144. Crane, 534 U.S. at 413.
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X. Conclusion
In the recent decision Bradshaw v. Stumpf,15 the United States
Supreme Court addressed the implications of procedural immorality.
In Bradshaw, a prisoner claimed a violation of due process when the
state argued in one co-defendant's murder trial that he was the
triggerman and then contradicted this position by alleging in a
subsequent trial that a co-defendant was in fact the murderer.'
4 6
Although the Court ultimately remanded the petitioner's claim,
Justice Souter, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Ginsberg,
noted:
[Petitioner's] position was anticipated by Justice Stevens'
observation 10 years ago that "serious questions are raised
when the sovereign itself takes inconsistent positions in two
separate criminal proceedings against two of its
citizens . .,147 "Justice Stevens' statement in turn echoed
the more general one expressed by Justice Sutherland in
Berger v. United States (citation omitted), that the State's
interest in winning some point in a given case is transcended
by its interest 'that justice shall be done.' 1 8
The same concerns acknowledged by Justice Souter in Bradshaw
are implicated when the state adopts conflicting positions in a
defendant's criminal trial and subsequent civil commitment hearing.' 9
To allow the state to endorse irreconcilable positions in order to
deprive an individual of his or her liberty on multiple occasions is to
allow "the adversary system of prosecution.., to descend to a
gladiatorial level unmitigated by any prosecutorial obligation for the
sake of truth .. .. ""' This quest for the truth - not the thrill of victory
- should be the government's paramount concern when seeking to
remove a citizen from society at large, whether through criminal
proceedings or civil commitment.
To remedy this unfair discrepancy, the Supreme Court's sexually
violent predator civil commitment due process jurisprudence should
incorporate the protections afforded by collateral estoppel and the
145. 125 S. Ct. 2398 (2005)
146. Id. at 2408 (Souter, J., concurring).
147. Id. at 2409 (quoting Jacobs v. Scott, 513 U.S. 1067, 1070 (1995)).
148. Id. at 2409 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
149. Justices Souter and Ginsberg also joined the portion of Justice Breyer's dissenting
opinion in Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 381 (Breyer, J., dissenting), arguing that the involuntary
civil commitment provisions of the Kansas SVP Act constitute punishment.
150. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439 (1995) (noting that when the prosecution in a
criminal case is unsure whether information in its possession is exculpatory, the prosecutor
should err toward disclosure rather than withhold such information from the defendant).
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Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause. Since 1970, collateral
estoppel has been an essential ingredient of double jeopardy which
prevents the relitigation of identical issues."' Because a civil
commitment hearing involves a potential deprivation of liberty, it
should conform not only with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments'
due process requirements,152 but also with these amendments' implicit
double jeopardy protections.'53 Application of this understanding of
due process leads to one conclusion: states that provide for criminal
insanity defenses and sexually violent predator civil commitment
should apply a uniform standard of mental responsibility for criminal
conduct. Otherwise, sexually violent predator civil commitment
hearings based on the same offense and the same mental health
inquiry previously rejected in an insanity defense will lack the
consistency and fairness which due process affords all citizens.
151. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 465 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
152. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).
153. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27; Talcott, 444 F.2d at 458-59.
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